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“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the Supreme Court, and  
Lawrence the “Laggard” 
AUDREY K. HAGEDORN* 
“If you’re a homophobe, we won’t ask and you don’t tell.” 
– John K. Jacobs, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, December 20, 2010 
______________________________ 
INTRODUCTION 
September 20, 2011, officially marked the end of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
(DADT),1 the longstanding ban on gays and lesbians serving openly in the 
military.2 Congress and President Obama had successfully pushed through a 
last-minute repeal effort in the final hours of the 2010 congressional session,3 and 
nearly nine months later, the repeal formally went into effect.4 
After a quiet beginning, President Obama finally made good on one of the many 
promises he made in an open letter to gay Americans written during his 2008 
presidential campaign.5 For the first time in U.S. military history since World War 
II, the military would no longer be able to actively exclude openly gay and lesbian 
service members.6 The President, congressional Democrats, and gay rights activists 
heralded the repeal of DADT as a “victory,” and as activists celebrated outside the 
Capitol Building, it was clear that the end of DADT marked an important step in 
the gay rights movement.7 Open access to the military was one of the last 
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 1. Ed O’Keefe, ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Ends in Quiet, Personal Ways, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 20, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dont-ask-dont-tell-ends-in-quiet-
personal-ways/2011/09/20/gIQAn69uiK_story.html. 
 2. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006). 
 3. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515; see 
also Carl Hulse, Senate Ends Military Ban on Gays Serving Openly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 
2010, at A1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military.html.  
 4. Under section 2, the Repeal Act did not immediately take effect until sixty days after 
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
certified that the military was ready for the change to occur. 124 Stat. at 3515–16. That 
certification did not take place until July 22, 2011, marking September 20, 2011, as the 
official end date to DADT. Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2011, at A13. 
 5. Barack Obama’s Letter to the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Community, 
GAY RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 28, 2008, 11:44 PM) [hereinafter Open Letter], 
http://www.gayrightswatch.com/2008/ 02/barack-obamas-letter-to-gay-lesbian.html. 
 6. George Chauncey, Op-Ed., Last Ban Standing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, at A35 
(describing the ban on open service in the military as “a crucial issue for the gay movement 
for 65 years” following the end of World War II).  
 7. Hulse, supra note 3, at A1. 
796 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:795 
 
remaining areas of American life that was legally off-limits to gay Americans.8 
Now gay and lesbian service members could serve openly and proudly. 
Massachusetts House Representative Barney Frank summed up the momentous 
occasion: “If you can fight for your country, you can do anything.”9  
To the less scrutinizing eye, the legislative repeal of DADT represents a 
successful end to a very long struggle. But, in reality, the fall of DADT stands for 
relatively limited progress in the gay rights arena. That progress is narrow because 
DADT was the subject of criticism from the moment Congress enacted it nearly 
eighteen years ago during the Clinton administration.10 Purporting to be a 
“live-and-let-live” policy, DADT supposedly “distinguished between ‘being gay’ 
and ‘acting on being gay.’”11 In practice, however, DADT was merely a 
codification of the existing military policy—a “de facto ban” on gays in the 
military12—and gay rights activists quickly challenged the law.13 Despite the 
immediate opposition, over seventeen years elapsed before any judicial challenge 
culminated in a decision striking down DADT.14 These challenges came in the fall 
of 2010. 
In Witt v. Department of the Air Force15 and Log Cabin Republicans v. United 
States,16 District Judges Ronald Leighton and Virginia Phillips, respectively, ruled 
DADT unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds. Notably, Witt and Log 
Cabin Republicans came just over a year after the Supreme Court declined the 
chance to hear a constitutional challenge to DADT in Cook v. Gates.17 While Witt 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. David A. Fahrenthold, For Gay Rights, Is Repeal of ‘Don’t Ask’ Military Ban the 
End or the Beginning?, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/19/AR2010121903719.html. 
 9. Stolberg, supra note 3. 
 10. See Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, A Ban by Any Other Name: Ten Years of “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell,” 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 403, 408–10 (2004) (“The public understood 
[DADT] to be a ‘live-and-let-live’ rule, and in the minds of many involved . . . that was 
indeed the intent of the law. However, in practice the new policy turned out to be anything 
but a laizzez-faire approach to sexual orientation in the military.” (emphasis in original)); see 
also Emily B. Hecht, Debating the Ban: The Past, Present and Future of Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell, N.J. LAW, June 2007, at 46 (“In practice, . . . what was supposed to be a kinder, gentler 
policy toward gays in the military has proven to be no different than prior regulations . . . .”). 
 11. Alexander, supra note 10, at 410. 
 12. Robert I. Correales, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: A Dying Policy on the Precipice, 44 
CAL. W. L. REV. 413, 414 (2008). 
 13. See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Abel v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d 
Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 14. See Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Log 
Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 15. Witt, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308, on remand from 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008). Judge 
Leighton’s decision invalidating DADT utilized a three-part test announced by the Ninth 
Circuit in 2008. See infra notes 115–26 and accompanying text. 
 16. Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884.  
 17. 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Pietrangelo v. Gates, 129 S. Ct. 
2763 (2009); see also William Branigin, Supreme Court Turns Down ‘Don’t Ask’ Challenge, 
WASH. POST, June 8, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
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and Log Cabin Republicans generated the congressional, presidential, military, and 
public discourse that ultimately lead to the legislative repeal of DADT in late 2010, 
the issues raised and the questions asked in 2010 were no different from those 
raised and asked in Cook v. Gates in 2009.  
In fact, Lawrence v. Texas, the landmark Supreme Court decision invalidating a 
Texas law criminalizing sodomy,18 opened the door to DADT’s repeal as early as 
2004. Interestingly, however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the only 
DADT challenge presented to it after 2004.19 Indeed, the Court has refused to utter 
a single word regarding Lawrence’s reach in any context since 2003. This silence 
has not been for want of opportunities; rather, the Court has had several chances to 
clarify Lawrence’s reach.20 It has not done so. The Court’s silence has been 
particularly frustrating for proponents of gay rights because Lawrence potentially 
holds the key to full constitutional respect for gay Americans and equal protection 
under the law.21 This respect and equality arguably includes same-sex marriage. 
Without knowing what Lawrence protects, it becomes difficult for the gay rights 
movement to gain momentum through the judicial branch.  
In 2009, the stage was set for an answer to the central questions surrounding 
Lawrence. Cook v. Gates gave the Supreme Court a second chance to strike down 
DADT once and for all, and more importantly, give gay rights activists a significant 
tool to push onward with judicial challenges to prohibitions on same-sex marriage. 
Instead, the Supreme Court decided not to decide.  
This Note uses the story of DADT to argue that the Supreme Court has been 
strategically side-stepping Lawrence v. Texas since 2003. Specifically, this Note 
argues that the Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari to Cook v. Gates in 
2009 was based in part on strategic considerations. The Court, conservative at the 
time, did not want to vote its sincere policy preferences. More importantly, 
however, the Court did not want to revisit Lawrence v. Texas so soon or move 
forward with its substantive due process jurisprudence in the context of gay rights. 
Unfortunately for gay rights activists, the Court’s decision has kept lower courts in 
the dark. In 2009, the Supreme Court took one look at the surrounding political 
climate and passed on DADT. This Note attempts to explain why. By 
understanding the Court’s decision to deny certiorari to Cook as a strategic choice, 
this Note offers a different perspective on the fall of DADT, Lawrence v. Texas, 
and the future of the gay rights movement in the judiciary.  
                                                                                                                 
article/2009/06/08/AR2009060801368.html. 
 18. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 19. See Cook, 528 F.3d 42, cert. denied sub nom. Pietrangelo, 129 S. Ct. 2763.  
 20. See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir.) (applying Lawrence to a 
Wisconsin statute criminalizing incest), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 988 (2005); Williams v. Att’y 
Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236–38 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying Lawrence to Alabama 
statute prohibiting commercial distribution of sex toys), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005); 
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 
2004) (applying Lawrence to a Florida law prohibiting gay adoption), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 
1081 (2005). 
 21. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare 
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1945–51 (2004) (arguing that “the underlying 
theory and most important passages of Lawrence suggest ready . . . applicability of the 
holding to same-sex marriage”).  
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The argument proceeds in three steps. Part I chronicles the history of the Court’s 
substantive due process analysis in the context of gay rights and includes an 
in-depth discussion of the landmark decision Lawrence v. Texas. Part II discusses 
the strategies employed by the Supreme Court to avoid controversial issues and 
applies this explanation of judicial behavior to DADT. Part III concludes by 
considering the consequences of the Court’s behavior and what the legislative 
repeal of DADT may mean for the future success of the gay rights movement in the 
judiciary. 
I. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND ONE PATH TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
This Part details the history of the Court’s substantive due process analysis in 
the context of gay rights, focusing on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision 
Lawrence v. Texas and its aftermath. After reviewing the Supreme Court’s 
substantive due process approach to cases dealing with gay rights prior to 
Lawrence, the discussion turns to the Court’s decision in Lawrence and offers an 
explanation of the majority opinion. The final two sections in this Part pay 
significant attention to the response to Lawrence—from both the outside legal 
community and from within the appellate courts system. 
A. Pre-Lawrence Substantive Due Process 
The idea of substantive due process, or “what it means for the state to deprive 
someone of ‘liberty’ without ‘due process of law’ in the substantive sense,”22 has 
been debated by courts since its inception.23 Adopted to protect the rights of freed 
slaves,24 today the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has grown to 
embody a fundamental right to autonomy. This autonomy includes such rights as 
the right to contraception,25 the right to procreate,26 and the right to abortion.27 The 
basic idea is that substantive due process protects those “fundamental rights” which 
are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”28 or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition.”29 Courts strive to protect these fundamental rights. Any law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. Id. at 1897. 
 23. Jason A. Crook, Exposing the Contradiction: An Originalist’s Approach to 
Understanding Why Substantive Due Process Is a Constitutional Misinterpretation, 10 NEV. 
L.J. 1, 1–2 (2009) (“Few phrases in American jurisprudence have created more of a stir or 
inspired greater controversy than the seventeen words that comprise the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . In light of its linguistic incongruity and the versatility of 
its judicial precedents, one could fairly state that the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause has been the subject of passionate debate and varying 
interpretation ever since its ratification in 1868.”). 
 24. Id. at 2. 
 25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 26. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 27. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 28. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citing Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 29. Id. at 721 (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
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that infringes upon a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires 
the government to put forth “an interest sufficiently compelling to place within the 
realm of the reasonable a refusal to recognize the individual right.”30 If a law does 
not implicate strict scrutiny, courts may apply either rational basis review31 or 
intermediate scrutiny.32 Under rational basis review, a challenged law must only 
further some legitimate goal in order to pass judicial review.33 Intermediate scrutiny 
lies somewhere between rational basis review and strict scrutiny.34  
The Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence in the context of gay rights 
has been limited. Prior to Lawrence, the Supreme Court engaged in a long pattern 
of avoiding cases dealing with gay rights.35 Most of the time the Court would 
simply deny certiorari to any case dealing with gay rights.36 H. W. Perry’s study of 
the Court’s agenda setting lends credence to this point.37 His findings indicate that 
gay rights jurisprudence was one area of law that the Court consistently avoided.38 
In fact, from 1967 to 1984, the Court did not hear oral arguments in any case 
dealing with gay rights.39 When the Court did hear a case, it usually chose to affirm 
a harsh lower court decision.40 According to Professor Christopher Leslie, the 
Court’s behavior was illustrative of a “collective decision to avoid the controversial 
issue of gay rights.”41 Bowers v. Hardwick,42 the crucial substantive due process 
case in the context of gay rights prior to Lawrence, was an anomaly. 
In Bowers, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Georgia law 
criminalizing sodomy between two consenting adults.43 Justice White took 
considerable pains to frame the legal issue at stake narrowly. Instead of looking at 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. Id. at 766–67 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  
 31. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–34 (1996). 
 33. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) 
(holding that a law need not even be “logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional”). 
 34. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531–34. 
 35. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Importance of Lawrence in the Context of the 
Supreme Court’s Historical Treatment of Gay Litigants, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 189, 191 
(2005) (“Before Lawrence, gay victims of legal injustice generally did not receive relief in 
the Supreme Court. . . . The Court was a place where advocates of gay rights would seek 
relief but be denied . . . .”). 
 36. See id. at 207–14. 
 37. H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 254–59 (1991). 
 38. See id.  
 39. Leslie, supra note 35, at 210. 
 40. See, e.g., Boutilier v. INS, 363 F.2d 488, 495–96 (2d Cir. 1966), aff’d, 387 U.S. 118, 
120–24 (1967) (holding alien’s admission of homosexual activities prior to entry into the 
United States was sufficient evidence of “psychopathic personality” to justify deportation); 
Doe v. Commonwealth’s Att’y for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 
1975) (holding that Virginia’s sodomy law did not violate any constitutional right to 
privacy), aff’d, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
 41. Leslie, supra note 35, at 209. 
 42. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 43. Id. at 186. 
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the broader issue of whether a fundamental right to private sexual intimacy exists, 
White “callously mischaracterized”44 the issue as whether a fundamental right 
existed for “homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”45 White and the Court answered in 
the negative, holding that “to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”46 The Court then applied rational basis review and 
upheld the Georgia law.47 Given the Court’s use of rational basis in Bowers, any 
law regulating private conduct between same-sex couples was likely to be upheld.48 
This was certainly the case for DADT.  
Following Bowers, lower courts repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of 
DADT in a string of cases that arose after its enactment in 1993.49 For example, in 
Richenberg v. Perry, the Eighth Circuit dismissed a substantive due process 
challenge to DADT after determining that DADT rationally addressed the 
military’s purpose of reducing “sexual tensions” that might “jeopardize unit 
cohesion.”50 In addition to the general deference that rational basis review 
requires,51 the majority of these courts were especially deferential to the military 
and its argument that the presence of gays in the military harmed its ability to 
provide national defense.52 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that it was “difficult to 
conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts [had] less 
competence.”53 Indeed, the Supreme Court had long granted deference to the 
military,54 which is presumably why the Court declined to grant certiorari to any of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. Correales, supra note 12, at 434. By framing the issue this way, the Bowers majority 
effectively evaded the issue of “decisional privacy” and simultaneously cast a shadow of 
immorality upon homosexuality in general. Id. at 434–36 (“The majority’s negative 
characterization of the issue before the Court and its aggressive moral condemnation of gay 
relationships created an ever-widening shadow from which it became nearly impossible to 
escape.”). 
 45. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
 46. Id. at 194. 
 47. Id. at 196. 
 48. Rational basis review is highly deferential; legislation must only be “rationally 
related” to some legitimate state interest in order to pass judicial scrutiny. See City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is that 
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the 
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”); see also supra text accompanying 
note 33. 
 49. See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d. 256, 261 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 
934 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 50. 97 F.3d at 262. 
 51. See supra note 48.  
 52. See Correales, supra note 12, at 414 (arguing that the most successful argument 
cited in favor of DADT was the belief of a few military leaders that DADT protected the 
“sensibilities of a small group of heterosexuals” who felt threatened by gays and lesbians 
serving openly in the military). 
 53. Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)). 
 54. See e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (“[T]he Constitution 
contemplate[s] that the Legislative Brach have plenary control over rights, duties, and 
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these early cases. The 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, however, seemed to 
change everything. 
B. Lawrence v. Texas 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas law that 
criminalized sodomy, overruling Bowers v. Hardwick.55 Criticizing “the Court’s 
failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake” in Bowers,56 Justice Kennedy 
reframed the issue before the Court as whether two consenting gay adults had the 
liberty to engage in private sexual conduct under the Due Process Clause.57 Justice 
Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
held that they did. The Court reasoned that “[homosexuals’] right to liberty under 
the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in [homosexual] conduct 
without intervention of the government” and that Texas’s law “furthered no 
legitimate state interest which could justify its intrusion into the personal and 
private life of the individual.”58 Further, the Court rejected morality as a legitimate 
state interest: “[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally 
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a 
law prohibiting the practice.”59 In his dissent Justice Scalia criticized the majority 
for not adhering to stare decisis, pointing out that “nowhere does the Court’s 
opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a ‘fundamental right’ under the Due 
Process Clause.”60  
Perhaps Justice Scalia was right to point out the Court’s omission. The Court 
was curiously silent about the level of scrutiny it was applying.61 The words 
“fundamental right” did not appear in the opinion,62 and the Court did not employ 
the traditional approach to substantive due process questions implicating 
fundamental rights.63 This approach first defines a right as fundamental and then 
                                                                                                                 
responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment . . . .”); Rostker v. Goldberg, 
453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (“[J]udicial deference . . . is at its apogee when legislative action 
under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations 
for their governance is challenged.”). 
 55. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 56. Id. at 567. In reframing the issue, Justice Kennedy broadened the liberty at stake to 
encompass not only a particular kind of sexual conduct but all sexual behavior in the home. 
Id. (“To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct 
demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were 
it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved 
in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a 
particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching 
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the 
most private of places, the home.”). 
 57. Id. at 564. 
 58. Id. at 578. 
 59. Id. at 577–78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 
 60. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 61. See Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1116 (2004). 
 62. See Lawrence, 339 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 63. See Hunter, supra note 61, at 1116 (“By asking the question of whether the 
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considers whether the government’s interest is compelling enough to override that 
right.64 Rather, the Court held that Texas’s law was an impermissible intrusion on 
an individual’s autonomy absent a more legitimate reason than promoting 
morality.65 Was the Court applying rational basis to strike down the law prohibiting 
sodomy or was it using a form of heightened scrutiny to protect some “private 
sexual intimacy” for conduct between same-sex couples? 
While Justice Scalia characterized the decision as “an unheard-of form of 
rational-basis review that will have far-reaching implications,”66 it is unlikely that 
the Court used rational basis review in Lawrence. Rather, the majority’s standard of 
review most likely took some form of heightened scrutiny. First, the Supreme 
Court overruled the Texas statute. This fact alone is significant because rational 
basis review “will almost never lead to the invalidation of a state law.”67 
Admittedly, the Court never explicitly recognized the standard of review it was 
using to strike down the Texas law. However, the outcome in a case can be more 
indicative than what the words in the opinion say. The process of announcing a 
standard of review “is often more conclusory than informative” and is actually only 
an “occasional practice” that is used by the Court.68 Importantly, Professor 
Laurence Tribe suggests that characterizing the test in Lawrence as rational basis 
“requires overlooking passage after passage in which the Court’s opinion indeed 
invoked the talismanic verbal formula of substantive due process.”69 Indeed, the 
Court looked to all the precedents which comprise the heart of the substantive due 
process right to make autonomous decisions—Griswold,70 Roe,71 and Casey.72 If 
Lawrence was analogous to these seminal decisions, the protected liberty interest 
was at least related to individual autonomy in some way. 
In sum, the Court’s approach in Lawrence arguably added the fundamental right 
to private sexual intimacy to the list of protected substantive due process rights by 
recognizing that “the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct 
extends beyond the marital relationship.”73 If true, the decision in Lawrence 
                                                                                                                 
governmental action had a legitimate basis first, and concluding that it did not, the Court did 
not need to then ask whether the individual was seeking to exercise a fundamental 
right . . . .”).  
 64. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (“Our 
established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we 
have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental 
rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’ Second, we have required in 
substantive-due-process cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest.” (citations omitted)). 
 65. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–79. 
 66. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 67. Hunter, supra note 61, at 1113. See generally supra text accompanying note 33. 
 68. Tribe, supra note 21, at 1916–17. 
 69. Id. at 1917.  
 70. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–65 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965)). 
 71. Id. at 565 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 72. Id. at 573–74 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).  
 73. Id. at 565. 
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invalidated any statute that interferes with private consensual sexual conduct 
between anyone—gay or straight. DADT, which explicitly banned homosexual 
conduct in the military,74 fell squarely into this category. There is no question that 
Lawrence demanded more than Bowers. But would Lawrence have “far-reaching 
implications” in the larger fight for gay rights? 
C. The Brown v. Board of Education of the Gay Rights Movement? 
Professor Laurence Tribe, the losing attorney in Bowers,75 suggested that 
“Lawrence may well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of gay and lesbian 
America.”76 Given that Brown v. Board of Education77 is arguably the most 
celebrated decision in Supreme Court history, Professor Tribe paid Lawrence no 
small compliment. Like Brown, some Americans hoped that the “sweeping” 
language of Lawrence would stand for “constitutional liberty for gay men and 
lesbians.”78 Professor Christopher Leslie hailed the Supreme Court as “an 
institution where gay Americans can seek justice,”79 noting that the decision had 
“change[d] the entire relationship between gay Americans and their Supreme 
Court.”80 With Lawrence, many scholars believed that the Court had removed from 
states the ability to discriminate against gay Americans in a variety of contexts—
“including employment, child custody, and immigration.”81 Most significantly, the 
decision in Lawrence was both celebrated by gay rights activists and feared by 
social conservatives to be a powerful weapon in the battle to legalize same-sex 
marriage.82  
Professor Lisa Parshall argued, however, that Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
“undercut Lawrence as a foundation for gay marriage by indicating that the ruling 
did not require formal recognition of homosexual relations by the state.”83 It is true 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (2006) (providing that a member of the armed forces can 
be separated if there is a finding that “the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or 
solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts”). 
 75. See Martin A. Schwartz, Lawrence v. Texas: The Decision and Its Implications for 
the Future, 20 TOURO L. REV. 221, 232 (2004). 
 76. Tribe, supra note 21, at 1895. 
 77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 78. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Homosexual Rights; Justices, 6–3, Legalize 
Gay Sexual Conduct in Sweeping Reversal of Court’s ’86 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 
2003, at A1. 
 79. Leslie, supra note 35, at 219. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 189; see also Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted 
by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000) (arguing that the 
existence of state sodomy laws branded gay men and lesbians as criminals in other contexts, 
such as gay adoption, and limited their rights and defenses in those areas). 
 82. See, e.g., Sarah Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights Vow State-by-State Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 6, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/06/us/adversaries-on-gay-rights-vow-
state-by-state-fight.html?src=pm. For a good discussion of both the liberal and conservative 
response to Lawrence, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (And Goodridge), 104 
MICH. L. REV. 431, 459–73 (2005). 
 83. Lisa K. Parshall, Redefining Due Process Analysis: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy 
804 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:795 
 
that the Court shied away from ruling on the alternate Equal Protection challenge in 
Lawrence.84 Justice Kennedy directly stated that Lawrence did “not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”85 But Parshall concedes that “[i]n some ways, 
Justice Kennedy has carefully laid the foundation for the recognition of gay 
marriage by granting protection to homosexual conduct and rejecting moral 
opprobrium as a legitimate basis for the disparate treatment of lesbians and gays.”86 
By renouncing morality as a legitimate state interest and adopting Justice Stevens’s 
dissent in Bowers,87 Justice Kennedy had dealt a heavy blow to the morality 
argument against same-sex marriage.88  
In fact, just five months after Lawrence the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
handed down Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,89 making Massachusetts 
the first state to legalize same-sex marriage.90 The Massachusetts court wrote: 
 [In Lawrence], the Court affirmed that the core concept of common 
human dignity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution precludes government intrusion into the deeply 
personal realms of consensual adult expressions of intimacy and one’s 
choice of an intimate partner. . . .  
 Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil 
marriage, a person who enters into an intimate, exclusive union with 
another of the same sex is arbitrarily deprived of membership in one of 
our community’s most rewarding and cherished institutions. That 
exclusion is incompatible with the constitutional principles of respect 
for individual autonomy and equality under law.91 
Confirming both liberal and conservative predictions,92 the language in Goodridge 
echoed the broad liberty interest described in Lawrence. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court would not be the only state court to use Lawrence as a tool to 
                                                                                                                 
and the Concept of Emergent Rights, 69 ALB. L. REV. 237, 263 (2005). 
 84. See Arthur S. Leonard, Exorcising the Ghosts of Bowers v. Hardwick: Uprooting 
Invalid Precedents, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519, 524 (2009). Although it declined to consider 
the Equal Protection argument, the Court admitted that the argument was “tenable.” 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–75 (2003). Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, in fact, 
made that argument. Id. at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Leonard, supra.  
 85. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 86. Parshall, supra note 83, at 263–64. 
 87. See supra text accompanying note 59.  
 88. See Leonard, supra note 84, at 545–46. 
 89. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Interestingly, Massachusetts was both the first state to 
legalize same-sex marriage and the state with the lowest divorce rate in the country. This fact 
remained unchanged even after five years of permitting same-sex marriage. Bruce Wilson, 
After 5 Years of Legal Gay Marriage, Massachusetts Still Has the Lowest State Divorce Rate 
and Western Civilization Is Intact, ALTERNET BLOG (Aug. 24, 2009, 6:18 AM), 
http://www.alternet.org/blogs/.  
 90. Pam Belluck, Same-Sex Marriage: The Overview; Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples 
Wed in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A1. 
 91. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948–49. 
 92. See text accompanying note 82. 
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legalize same-sex marriage. The highest courts in California,93 Connecticut,94 and 
Iowa95 subsequently followed suit, each citing to Lawrence in opinions legalizing 
same-sex marriages.  
The decision in Lawrence also renewed efforts to end DADT. Immediately after 
the Court announced Lawrence in 2003, gay rights activists believed that the 
judicial repeal of DADT was within reach.96 As early as the spring of 2004, the 
elimination of DADT was not a question of if, but rather, a question of when and 
how.97 However, critics soon characterized the opinion as “heavier on rhetoric than 
on clarity,”98 and some scholars hesitated to agree that Lawrence protected a 
fundamental right to private sexual intimacy.99 Others, like Professor Nan Hunter, 
argued that Lawrence was intentionally vague—both broad and flexible—and 
meant to allow lower courts to determine its future.100 It turns out that Hunter’s 
argument was not far off: interpreting Lawrence is exactly what lower courts have 
been struggling with for the past eight years.  
D. The Circuits Respond to Lawrence 
Because of the Court’s muddled analysis, lower courts have hesitated to 
embrace the heightened protection provided by Lawrence.101 Generally courts have 
erred on the conservative side and held that Lawrence does not recognize a 
fundamental right to private sexual intimacy.102 This conservative approach has, to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). In re Marriage Cases was 
superseded by California constitutional amendment. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 
2009). 
 94. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
 95. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). For further discussion of state court 
decisions on the issue of same-sex marriage, see generally Chase D. Anderson, Note, A 
Quest for Fair and Balanced: The Supreme Court, State Courts, and the Future of Same-Sex 
Marriage Review After Perry, 60 DUKE L.J. 1413 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court 
has approached cases dealing with sexual orientation using a “principle of neutrality”). 
 96. See, e.g., Gay Man, Citing Supreme Court Ruling, Fights ’97 Army Discharge, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2003, at A14. On July 8, 2003, just twelve days after the Supreme Court 
handed down Lawrence, a man filed a court challenge to DADT. Id. 
 97. See Alexander, supra note 10, at 434. 
 98. Hunter, supra note 61, at 1103. 
 99. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 75, at 227. 
 100. Hunter, supra note 61, at 1139 (“Perhaps the most significant point to bear in mind 
is that the function of lower federal courts, scholars, and practitioners now will be not so 
much to find the meaning of Lawrence as to create it.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 816 
(11th Cir. 2004) (“We are particularly hesitant to infer a new fundamental liberty interest 
from an opinion whose language and reasoning are inconsistent with standard fundamental–
rights analysis.”). 
 102. See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Lawrence . . . did not 
announce . . . a fundamental right, protected by the Constitution, for adults to engage in all 
manner of consensual sexual conduct . . . .”); Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817; see also Stephanie 
Francis Ward, Avoiding Lawrence: Courts Considering Last Year’s Major Gay Rights 
Ruling Are Treading Carefully, 90 A.B.A. J. 16, 16 (2004).  
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a certain extent, minimized the holding in Lawrence.103 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has remained noticeably absent from Lawrence’s progeny. As a result, lower 
courts have slowly been able to reduce Lawrence’s impact. Two cases coming from 
the Eleventh Circuit serve as good examples. 
In Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services, the 
Eleventh Circuit considered a Florida statute that prohibited gay adoption.104 The 
statute applied to “homosexual[s],” which the court described as “applicants who 
are known to engage in current, voluntary homosexual activity.”105 The plaintiffs 
alleged that the statute, which regulated conduct, burdened the fundamental right 
recognized by the Court in Lawrence.106 The Eleventh Circuit, specifically focusing 
on the Supreme Court’s lack of a formal analysis in Lawrence, concluded that “it 
[was] a strained and ultimately incorrect reading of Lawrence to interpret it to 
announce a new fundamental right” and upheld the Florida statute after applying 
rational basis review.107 Shortly after Lofton, in Williams v. Attorney General of 
Alabama,108 the Eleventh Circuit faced another Lawrence question. Williams dealt 
with an Alabama statute that prohibited the sale of “sex toys.”109 Again, the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Lawrence did not recognize a fundamental right to 
sexual privacy and upheld the Alabama law.110  
The plaintiffs in both Lofton and Williams petitioned the Supreme Court for 
review; it promptly denied certiorari to both in 2005.111 Although a Florida 
appellate court recently declared the adoption statute in Lofton unconstitutional and 
the issue is now moot,112 the Supreme Court’s decision to avoid the issue of gay 
adoption in 2005 implicitly indicated that the Court was not willing to return to 
Lawrence so quickly. The same seemed true for the evaded sex toy issue in 
Williams. Perhaps the Eleventh Circuit was correct to interpret Lawrence as a 
narrow decision. This interpretation seems unlikely given the powerful language in 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion.113 However, because the Supreme Court refused to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 102, at 16 (reporting that many plaintiffs’ lawyers feared 
that courts were “backing away from Lawrence too quickly”). 
 104. 358 F.3d at 806–07. 
 105. Id. at 807 (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 
1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 106. Id. at 815. 
 107. Id. at 817. 
 108. 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 109. Id. at 1233. The Alabama statute, technically still in effect, disallows “any person to 
knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any 
obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation 
of human genital organs for anything of pecuniary value.” ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) 
(LexisNexis 2005). First-time offenders face a $10,000 fine and prison time. Id. 
 110. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1250 (“[W]e reject the ACLU’s request that we redefine the 
constitutional right to privacy to cover the commercial distribution of sex toys.”). 
 111. Lofton, 358 F.3d 804, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005); Williams, 378 F.3d 1232, 
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005). 
 112. See In re Matter of Adoption of X.X.G. and N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2010); see also Editorial, Victory for Families, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A22. 
 113. See supra text accompanying notes 57–60. 
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affirm whether the Eleventh Circuit correctly interpreted the meaning of Lawrence, 
lower courts still could not be sure of the nature and extent of its reach.  
After the Eleventh Circuit’s failure to vigorously apply Lawrence, challenges to 
DADT provided appellate courts with another opportunity to consider Lawrence. 
This time, courts were less conservative in their approach, and their opinions truly 
challenged the Court on Lawrence for the first time.114  
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to hand down 
a post-Lawrence decision relating to DADT. In Witt v. Department of the Air 
Force, the Ninth Circuit considered the due process claim of Major Margaret Witt, 
an Air Force combat flight nurse who was discharged after the military accused her 
of living with a woman.115 Major Witt argued that Lawrence “establish[ed] a 
fundamental right to engage in adult consensual sexual acts.”116 The Ninth Circuit 
was less inclined than previous courts to apply the rubber stamp of rational basis to 
Witt’s claim; instead, it concluded that “Lawrence requires something more than 
traditional rational basis review . . . .”117  
The Ninth Circuit determined that neither rational basis review nor strict 
scrutiny was consistent with Lawrence.118 Instead, the court looked to Sell v. United 
States119 for guidance. Sell was a Supreme Court case from 2003 in which the 
Court applied a heightened level of scrutiny.120 Sell was, in the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion, an expansion of Lawrence.121 In Sell, the Supreme Court considered 
whether the government can forcibly administer anti-psychotic drugs to a 
mentally-ill defendant in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial.122 
The Court held that the government is permitted to do so, but only if (1) there were 
important governmental interests at stake; (2) the involuntary medication would 
significantly further those interests; (3) the involuntary medication was actually 
necessary to further those interests; and (4) the administration of the drugs is 
medically appropriate.123  
The Ninth Circuit adapted the first three prongs of the Sell test into a 
“heightened scrutiny balancing analysis”:  
[W]hen the government attempts to intrude upon the personal and 
private lives of homosexuals, in a manner that implicates the rights 
identified in Lawrence, the government must advance an important 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are persuaded that 
Lawrence did indeed recognize a protected liberty interest for adults to engage in private, 
consensual sexual intimacy . . . .”); Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (“We cannot reconcile what the Supreme Court did in Lawrence with the minimal 
protections afforded by traditional rational basis review.”). 
 115. 527 F.3d at 810. 
 116. Id. at 813.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 816–18. 
 119. 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
 120. See id. at 179–83. 
 121. See Witt, 527 F.3d at 818. 
 122. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177. 
 123. Id. at 179–81. 
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governmental interest, the intrusion must significantly further that 
interest, and the intrusion must be necessary to further that interest.124  
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for factual determinations.125 
Unfortunately, Witt was not at a point procedurally where the Supreme Court could 
easily accept review in 2009.126 
Shortly after the decision in Witt, however, the First Circuit handed down a 
decision upholding the constitutionality of DADT in Cook v. Gates.127 Like the 
plaintiff in Witt, twelve former military members claimed that DADT violated their 
constitutional right to due process under Lawrence.128 The First Circuit agreed with 
the Ninth Circuit that Lawrence required some level of intermediate scrutiny 
protection to engage in private sexual intimacy.129 The court gave four reasons: (1) 
Lawrence relied on due process cases related to sexual intimacy; (2) the language 
in Lawrence suggested a protected liberty interest; (3) Lawrence relied on Justice 
Stevens’s dissent in Bowers; and (4) if Lawrence had employed rational basis, the 
Court would not have struck down the Texas statute.130 
However, the First Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s adaptation of the 
Sell decision.131 According to the First Circuit, the Sell Court merely “applied a 
standard of review less demanding than strict scrutiny” by asking if administering 
the drugs was necessary to further important governmental interests.132 The First 
Circuit saw Lawrence as employing a similar standard of review—one that 
balanced the government’s interest in preventing the perceived immoral conduct 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. Witt, 527 F.3d at 819. 
 125. Id. at 821–22. 
 126. On remand and just prior to DADT’s legislative repeal, District Judge Ronald 
Leighton ruled DADT unconstitutional by applying the Ninth Circuit’s test. See Witt v. 
Dep’t of the Air Force, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1316 (W.D. Wash. 2010), on remand from 
527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008). In Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, District Judge 
Virginia Phillips also found DADT unconstitutional using the Ninth Circuit’s test. 716 F. 
Supp. 2d 884, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Earlier this year, Witt ended in settlement; the Air Force 
agreed not to appeal the case, and Major Witt was reinstated. See Levi Pulkkinnen, Pentagon 
Settles with McChord Major Fired for Being Lesbian, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, May 
10, 2011, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Pentagon-settles-with-McChord-major-
fired-for- 1373728.php. Conversely, Log Cabin Republicans pushed onward. On October 12, 
2010, Judge Phillips issued a permanent injunction barring DADT’s enforcement worldwide. 
Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 929. The Ninth Circuit stayed Phillips’s 
injunction on October 20, 2010, however, pending an appeal by the Department of Justice. 
Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. 10-56634, 2010 WL 4136210 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 
2010). Log Cabin Republicans appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court, 
but the Court declined to intervene. 131 S. Ct. 589 (2010). The Ninth Circuit ended up 
reinstating Phillips’s order barring DADT’s enforcement on July 6, 2011, Log Cabin 
Republicans v. United States, No. 10-56813, 2011 WL 2982102 (9th Cir. July 15, 2011), 
until DADT officially expired on September 20, 2011. See O’Keefe, supra note 1. 
 127. 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 128. Id. at 47. 
 129. Id. at 52–53. 
 130. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 67–73. 
 131. Cook, 528 F.3d at 60 n.10. 
 132. Id. at 55. 
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and the degree of intrusion against an individual’s private sexual life.133 Unlike the 
Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit afforded significant deference to Congress in 
military affairs.134 After an extensive discussion of the Supreme Court’s deferential 
history with Congress on military affairs, the First Circuit ultimately found 
Congress’s finding that DADT “preserv[es] ‘high standards of morale, good order 
and discipline, and unit cohesion’ in the military” to be conclusive.135  
Witt and Cook were the first two Courts of Appeals to interpret Lawrence, the 
liberty interest it recognized, and the standard of review it employed in the context 
of DADT. However, the circuits were split in their approach.136 While the First 
Circuit’s balancing approach to DADT recognized that Lawrence required 
something more than heightened scrutiny, its application, like the Eleventh 
Circuit’s, had minimized the liberty interest in Lawrence. Conversely, the Ninth 
Circuit’s three-prong adaptation of Sell represented a direct challenge to the 
Supreme Court on Lawrence. Because of this split, many believed the Court would 
accept the case for review.137 On December 23, 2008, one of the plaintiffs in Cook, 
James Pietrangelo, petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari. A little over six 
months later, on June 8, 2009, the Supreme Court issued a memorandum decision 
denying his request.138 
In the summer of 2009, the stage was set for a Supreme Court decision on 
DADT. In light of the sweeping language in Lawrence and the parallels between 
Texas’s law prohibiting sodomy and DADT,139 the Supreme Court presumably 
would not ignore the issue much longer. The American public finally seemed ready 
to end the longstanding prohibition on homosexuals serving openly in the 
military.140 Even military officials were receptive to seeing the end of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. Id. at 56. 
 134. Id. at 57 (“It is unquestionable that judicial deference to congressional 
decision-making in the area of military affairs heavily influences the analysis and resolution 
of constitutional challenges that arise in this context.”). 
 135. Id. at 59. 
 136. See, e.g., Cecily Walters, Circuits Split over Military’s ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ 
Policy, TRIAL MAG., No. 44, Aug. 2008, at 65.  
 137. See id.  
 138. Cook, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Pietrangelo v. Gates, 129 
S. Ct. 2763 (2009).  
 139. Both the Texas law struck down in Lawrence and DADT focused on a particular 
type of conduct. Specifically, Texas’s statute criminalized “deviate sexual intercourse,” TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2011), invalidated by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), which the Texas Penal code defined as “any contact between any part of the genitals 
of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or the penetration of the genitals or 
the anus of another person with an object.” Id. § 21.01(1). Similarly, DADT prohibited 
members from “engag[ing] in, attempt[ing] to engage in, or solicit[ing] another to engage in 
a homosexual act.” 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (2006). DADT defined homosexual acts as “any 
bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same 
sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires; and any bodily contact which a reasonable 
person would understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in [a homosexual 
act].” Id. § 654(f)(3)(A)–(B).  
 140. See Elisabeth Bumiller, In Military, New Debate Over Policy Toward Gays, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A14. 
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discriminating policy.141 However, ignoring the issue is precisely the action the 
Court chose to take. Why did the Court choose not to decide? Still the better 
question is how could it not decide? When considered as a strategic choice, the 
Supreme Court’s decision to pass on the DADT question in Cook in 2009 becomes 
less overwhelming (and perhaps a little underwhelming).  
II. A STRATEGIC COURT 
Like all political actors, the Supreme Court acts strategically. The Court acts and 
makes decisions based on the goals and likely actions of the other main branches.142 
The denial of certiorari in Cook happened not long after a Democratic President 
took office for the first time in eight years.143 Joined by a comfortable Democratic 
majority in Congress,144 President Obama had already announced that abolishing 
DADT was a priority.145 With a Democratic President and majority in Congress, 
the Supreme Court faced three options: (1) grant certiorari in Cook, affirm the First 
Circuit’s holding, and send a strong message of defiance to the new administration 
and Congress; (2) grant certiorari in Cook, reverse the First Circuit’s holding, and 
expand the holding in Lawrence; or (3) choose to send a different message—
silence.146  
This Part first turns to an explanation of Professors Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, 
and Andrew Martin’s strategic model of judicial behavior and then considers the 















                                                                                                                 
 
 141. A 2006 military study by Zogby International indicated that 73% of currently 
serving military members were “comfortable” with gays and lesbians serving openly 
alongside them. SAM RODGERS, ZOGBY INT’L, OPINIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ON SEXUAL 
MINORITIES IN THE MILITARY 20 (2006), available at 
http://www.palmcenter.org/files/active/0/ZogbyReport.pdf. 
 142. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a 
Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 585 (2001). 
 143. See Adam Nagourney, Obama: Racial Barrier Falls in Decisive Victory, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1. 
 144. See id.  
 145. See Open Letter, supra note 5. 
 146. See infra Figure 1 outlining these three options. 
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Figure 1: The Court’s Options in Cook 
 
       
 Grant certiorari in Cook  
Affirm Cook thereby 
limiting Lawrence  
Face legislative 
override  
       
 Grant certiorari in Cook  
Reverse Cook thereby 
expanding Lawrence  
Open one path to 
same-sex marriage  
       
 Deny certiorari in Cook  
Thereby refusing to 
address Lawrence  
Allow legislative 
repeal  
       
 
A. The Judicial Review Game 
Over two hundred years ago, the Supreme Court solidified its power within the 
system of checks and balances in a single decision, Marbury v. Madison.147 
Marbury announced the Court’s power of judicial review and gave the Court the 
ability to void any congressional law it deemed unconstitutional.148 While the 
power of judicial review is an impressive tool, it reflects a strange situation. How 
can an unelected Supreme Court have the ability to overrule the decisions of the 
elected officials in Congress? This situation, labeled the “counter-majoritarian 
Difficulty” by Alexander Bickel,149 has been the source of much academic debate 
over the years.150  
However, according to Epstein, Knight, and Martin, the American people need 
not worry about the counter-majoritarian difficulty too much.151 Despite the fact 
that Justices are primarily “single-minded seekers of legal policy,”152 the separation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 148. See id. 
 149. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962). Bickel used the phrase “counter-majoritarian difficulty” 
to describe the contention that judicial review is improper because unelected judges have the 
power to overrule elected representatives, which, by its nature, is counter to majority will. 
See id.  
 150. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 333 (1998); Illya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A 
New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287 
(2004). 
 151. Epstein et al., supra note 142, at 584–85. 
 152. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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of powers system mandated by the Constitution limits the Court’s ability to blindly 
pursue individual policy and institutional goals.153 Instead, the Court has a strategic 
incentive to anticipate the preferences of elected officials and the American public 
and to react in a way that best ensures a “long-term effect on the nature and content 
of the law.”154 The idea is simple. Although the Court interprets the law and has the 
power to strike down any law Congress may pass, Congress will always have the 
ability to pass new legislation, which the President can either sign or veto.155 
Professor William Eskridge has named this interplay between the three branches 
the “Judicial Review Game.”156 Specifically, Article I, Section 7 requires bicameral 
approval and presentment to the President before a bill becomes law; Article II 
prohibits Congress from having a role in the law’s enforcement; and Article III 
creates an independent judiciary, the Supreme Court, “to mitigate unjust and partial 
lawmaking.”157  
 
Figure 2: The Judicial Review Game 
 














         
 
Consequently, strategic Supreme Court justices are not likely to vote their 
sincere preferences on an issue if those preferences are not in line with Congress or 
the President.158 Rather, the Court would see not only that Congress and the 
President could override its position but most likely would if given the 
opportunity.159 Instead, the Court rationally chooses to stay at what Epstein, 
Knight, and Martin call the “indifference point”—the closest point to the Court’s 
ideal policy position without risking congressional reaction.160 Eskridge contends 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. Epstein et al., supra note 142, at 585. 
 154. Id. at 585. 
 155. Id. at 592. 
 156. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Judicial Review Game, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 382, 384 
(1993). 
 157. Id.; see also infra Figure 2. Figure 2 was adapted from Eskridge’s own figure and 
illustrates the basic idea of the “judicial review game.” Eskridge, supra note 156, at 385. 
 158. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 152, at 12–17. 
 159. Epstein et al., supra note 142, at 594. 
 160. Id. Note that “congressional reaction” can refer to two different situations. Congress 
always has the ability to pass new legislation to bypass a Court decision declaring old 
legislation unconstitutional. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Congress also has the ability to 
override the Court through constitutional amendment, see U.S. CONST. art. V, which is much 
more difficult. This Note suggests that the Supreme Court would have affirmed Cook had it 
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that this choice is the obvious consequence of the judicial review game.161 What is 
not an obvious consequence of the judicial review game is that a rational Court can 
and will employ a variety of tools to pursue its policy preferences.162 One such tool 
is the decision to grant or deny certiorari in the first place.  
Since the Judiciary Act of 1925, the Supreme Court has been the “master of its 
domain” and has had sole discretion over its docket.163 In a typical year, the Court 
receives thousands of petitions for review; however, it decides to hear fewer than 
5%.164 The Court’s power to set its own agenda should not be understated. The 
certiorari process is more than a tool to limit the Court’s caseload to a reasonable 
number. Rather, the ability to grant review to a case or not gives the Court the 
ability to “bypass” any given controversy,165 raise the salience of a political 
issue,166 or even lower it.167 Arguably, deciding not to decide is “among the most 
important things done by the Supreme Court.”168  
The Court’s agenda-setting power is only getting bigger. In what scholars have 
dubbed the “incredible shrinking docket,”169 the Court is taking on fewer cases than 
ever before. From 1985 to 2004, the number of opinions issued by the Supreme 
Court shrunk from 161 to 85.170 The result, according to former D.C. Circuit judge, 
Kenneth Starr, is less clarity in the law.171 Unlike the Warren Court, whose decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education, for example, “reshap[ed] society’s institutions,”172 
the modern Supreme Court prefers to wait on public opinion and have the “last 
word” on divisive issues.173 This measured and reflective approach, Starr suggests, 
embodies a “flexible, case-by-case approach to constitutional interpretation” that is 
completely unpredictable.174 In 2009, the Court heard arguments in a mere 
ninety-two cases.175 Cook v. Gates was not one of them.176 Although not instantly 
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obvious, Starr’s argument fits in nicely with the story of DADT and the Court’s 
strategic decision.  
B. The DADT Game 
1. The Inevitable Repeal of DADT  
By 2009, the repeal of DADT was unavoidable. Former President Clinton’s 
promise of a “live-and-let-live” policy177 was, in fact, misleading.178 DADT was the 
only federal law that permitted the outright firing of U.S. citizens on the basis of 
sexual orientation.179 The policy had led to the discharge of more than 13,000 men 
and women since 1993,180 sending home valuable, much-needed military personnel 
in times of war. Moreover, discharge under DADT resulted in devastating personal 
and professional consequences181 and, from an economic perspective, cost the 
government a lot of money: the average annual cost from 1994–2003 just to recruit 
replacements for those discharged under DADT was $95 million a year.182 Perhaps 
the strongest argument in favor of abolishing DADT, however, was the time of war 
paradox. If gay and lesbian soldiers were supposedly weak, untrustworthy, and a 
detriment to unit cohesion, why did the military retain them at higher rates during 
times of war?183  
The presidential election in 2008 brought DADT to the forefront of the public’s 
eye once again. By that time, both the American public184 and military officials185 
had warmed to the idea of ending the discriminatory policy. The candidates were 
split along party lines—Republican John McCain adamantly opposed repeal, while 
Democrat Barack Obama was strongly in favor.186 With Obama’s decisive victory 
in November 2008,187 the legislative repeal of DADT became inevitable. 
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2. The Court’s Strategic Decision  
By the time the petition for certiorari in Cook v. Gates reached the Court in 
2009, the Court was in a unique position. Clearly the legislative repeal of DADT 
was just a matter of time.188 However, the central issue raised in Cook— whether 
Lawrence recognized a fundamental right to private sexual intimacy189—was still a 
highly controversial issue.190 The Court had already demonstrated its unwillingness 
to revisit Lawrence v. Texas in 2005 when it refused to consider Florida’s gay 
adoption statute and Alabama’s sex toy ban.191 By denying certiorari in Cook over 
four years later,192 the Court seemed to indicate that not much had changed. 
A brief look at the composition of the Supreme Court in 2009 may be one 
explanation about why the Court passed on Cook. Recall Epstein and Knight’s 
argument that Justices are “single-minded seekers of legal policy.”193 On this view, 
the decision a Justice makes in a single case should reflect his or her most preferred 
policy goal.194 In June 2009, five of the six Justices in the Lawrence majority 
remained on the Court—Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens.195 While 
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens presumably would have voted in favor of 
extending Lawrence and repealing DADT, Justice Kennedy had gone to great 
lengths to limit the scope of Lawrence.196 A decision on DADT could not occur 
without either limiting or expanding the central holding in Lawrence,197 and Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion had suggested that expansion was not an option. Moreover, in 
the years following Lawrence, two strong conservative voices came to the Court. 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined the Supreme Court in 2005 and 2006, 
respectively.198 With their presence, the Court moved sharply to the right, reaching 
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conservative decisions nearly 71% of the time,199 and the 2008 presidential election 
made it clear how conservatives viewed the DADT policy.200  
Still, composition alone cannot explain the Court’s decision to side-step the 
Lawrence question. Like Epstein and Knight suggest, the Court is constrained by 
other factors, including Congress, the President, and the American public.201 
Another constraint stems from the concept of institutional legitimacy.202 Scholars 
have long recognized that the “erosion of public support and institutional 
legitimacy has negative consequences for the Court’s power and institutional 
integrity.”203 Prior to her nomination to the Court, Justice Ginsburg discussed 
institutional legitimacy during a famous lecture criticizing Roe v. Wade: “[J]udges 
play an interdependent part in our democracy. They do not alone shape legal 
doctrine but . . . participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with 
the people as well.”204 In a lecture to the D.C. Circuit in 2000, former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist seconded Justice Ginsburg’s point, declaring that the Court’s integrity is 
“dependent upon the public’s respect for the judiciary.”205 Indeed, the Court has a 
strong incentive to be aware of public opinion on controversial issues,206 which 
invariably include gay rights.  
What happened in the 2010 Iowa election provides a good illustration of what 
can happen when a court fails to move cautiously in the area of gay rights. In 2009, 
the Iowa Supreme Court unanimously voted in Varnum v. Brien to legalize same-
sex marriage in Iowa.207 But Varnum was not in line with Iowa public opinion; only 
44% of the Iowa population supported gay marriage in 2010.208 On November 2, 
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2010, Iowa residents voted to remove three of the Iowa Supreme Court justices 
who took part in Varnum in a judicial retention election.209 Public dissatisfaction 
with the Varnum decision was clear when supporters of the campaign celebrated 
with signs declaring “No Activist Judges.”210 The Iowa Supreme Court was 
publicly rebuked because it ruled in favor of same-sex marriage before a majority 
of Iowa residents were ready. Such a public rebuke suggests that the Iowa court 
seriously miscalculated Iowa public opinion in 2009 and took a misguided step in 
the wrong direction. As a result, three justices lost their jobs and Varnum was left 
seriously weakened.211  
Iowa public opinion on same-sex marriage was reflective of the entire country in 
May 2009. While a May 2009 poll indicated that nearly 70% of Americans fully 
supported the repeal of DADT,212 only 40% of Americans supported same-sex 
marriage at that time.213 57% remained opposed.214 Unlike Varnum, the holding in 
Cook had nothing to do with same-sex marriage. However, the First Circuit had 
directly interpreted Lawrence, the liberty interest it recognized, and the standard of 
review that should apply.215 If the Court had granted certiorari in Cook, it would 
have been difficult to avoid Lawrence. Lawrence had already been used by many 
state courts as a stepping stone to same-sex marriage.216 Consider again the holding 
in Goodridge: “[In Lawrence], the Court affirmed that the core concept of common 
human dignity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . precludes government 
intrusion into the deeply personal realms of consensual adult expression of 
intimacy and one’s choice of an intimate partner.”217 Was the Supreme Court 
willing to return to Lawrence and open up such a broad liberty? Was the Court 
willing to reject it? Return for a moment to Starr’s argument.218 If the modern 
Court prefers to have the last word on the major issues that divide the nation, the 
judicial repeal of DADT had to wait. It is true that the Court does not need to worry 
about judicial retention elections; Supreme Court Justices have life tenure. 
However, the Court is concerned with something bigger: its institutional legitimacy 
and integrity.219 The surrounding political climate regarding gay rights was 
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anything but settled in 2009, and unlike the Iowa Supreme Court, the Supreme 
Court would not move without the support of the American public.  
In 2005, Professor Michael Klarman wrote an essay comparing the Lawrence 
decision to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.220 Klarman argued that the decision in Lawrence, like Brown, was 
merely a reflection of the current social attitude toward criminal prosecution for 
private sexual acts and not a “vanguard of a social reform movement.”221 Klarman 
pointed out that Brown, intentionally narrow and limited to education, only came 
after opinion polls showed that a majority of Americans supported an end to 
segregation in schools.222 In fact, when the Court had the post-Brown opportunity 
to extend its holding and invalidate antimiscegenation laws as early as 1955, the 
Court balked.223 The case was Naim v. Naim.224 
After Brown, a Chinese man who was married to a white woman in another state 
challenged a Virginia antimiscegenation law as unconstitutional under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.225 Klarman maintains that Naim “was the 
last case the Justices wished to see on their docket in 1955,” but the case fell within 
the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction at the time.226 The Court decided to simply 
remand Naim to the Virginia appellate court, leaving instructions to further remand 
the case to the trial court for further factual determinations.227 When the Virginia 
court refused to comply with the Court’s instructions, the petitioner again appealed 
to the Supreme Court.228 This time, the Court dismissed the case for lacking a 
“properly presented federal question.”229 Klarman contends that the Court preferred 
“being humiliated” to “further stroking the fires of racial controversy ignited by 
Brown.”230 Not until thirteen years after Brown, in Loving v. Virginia,231 would the 
Court move to strike down an antimiscegenation law. 
The repeal of DADT was inevitable regardless of the Court’s decision to grant 
review in Cook or not, but the decision to move forward with Lawrence was not. 
By avoiding Cook in 2009, the Court strategically postponed any further judicial 
discussion about Lawrence and effectively delayed one possible route to the 
judicial recognition of same-sex marriage. Part III considers the consequences of 
the Court’s behavior and what the legislative repeal of DADT may mean for the 
future of the gay rights movement’s success in the judiciary.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 220. See Klarman, supra note 82. 
 221. Id. at 444–45. 
 222. Id. at 445–46. 
 223. Id at 447. 
 224. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). 
 225. Id. at 751. 
 226. Klarman, supra note 82, at 447. 
 227. Naim, 350 U.S. 891. 
 228. See Klarman, supra note 82, at 449. 
 229. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985, 985 (1956). 
 230. Klarman, supra note 82, at 449.  
 231. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
2012] DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL 819 
 
III. THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS IN THE JUDICIARY 
Despite the legislative repeal of DADT in late 2010, the Supreme Court’s 
decision to circumvent the issues raised by a challenge to DADT in 2009 remains 
significant for several reasons. First, DADT’s days were limited. By the time the 
debate on DADT resurfaced in 2010, DADT had become “a near-perfect issue” for 
the gay rights movement.232 Many of DADT’s opponents were gays and lesbians 
who had served “valiantly” themselves,233 and the American public was fully 
behind an end to the discriminating ban. In fact, a May 2010 Gallup Poll showed 
that nearly 70% of Americans supported repeal.234 By December, that percentage 
had grown to nearly 77%.235 Moreover, unlike same-sex marriage or 
anti-discrimination laws, the legislative repeal of DADT did not embody an official 
government endorsement of homosexuality. Rather, repeal merely symbolized the 
government’s indifference to homosexuality within the relatively small military 
community.236 Lastly, the legislative repeal of DADT took seventeen years to 
materialize despite strong and continuous public opposition to DADT throughout 
its existence.237 Such a long period of time, according to Professor George 
Chauncey, is “not a sign of gay political power but of continuing gay political 
weakness.”238 
When one looks at the bigger picture, the fall of DADT stands for limited 
progress. The biggest issue for gay Americans remains same-sex marriage and all 
the federal benefits that come with it, such as Social Security, adoption rights, and 
tax benefits.239 In the United States, only six states and the District of Columbia 
recognize same-sex marriage.240 Even within these jurisdictions, the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines marriage as that between one 
man and one woman when “determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,” 241 
still prevents married same-sex couples from receiving certain federal benefits.242 
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Furthermore, twenty-nine states have enacted some type of constitutional 
restriction or ban on same-sex marriage.243 Other states are still considering adding 
one. The Indiana Senate, for example, passed a proposed amendment as recently as 
last March, which would amend the state’s constitution to ban same-sex 
marriage.244 Another twelve states have enacted some type of statutory restriction 
or ban on same-sex marriage.245 A recent development in the Justice Department 
has given gay rights activists a new reason to hope for change. Just two months 
after announcing that his position on same-sex marriage was “evolving,”246 
President Obama instructed the Justice Department to stop defending DOMA.247 
The President’s decision came after his administration had spent two years 
defending the bill.248 The Department of Justice will continue to enforce DOMA, 
however, until a final court decision is made on its constitutionality,249 and 
congressional Republicans have pledged to continue to defend DOMA.250 Most 
significantly, President Obama faces a difficult congressional climate in the coming 
2012 presidential election. 
Despite these setbacks, federal courts have continued to apply Lawrence in 
favorable decisions for the gay rights movement. In 2010, two decisions were 
particularly significant. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Judge Vaughn Walker struck 
down Proposition 8—a voter-approved ban on same-sex marriages in California—
on substantive due process and equal protection grounds.251 Broadly defining the 
substantive fundamental right at stake as the “right to marry,”252 Walker’s 
memorandum decision included a heading that directly baited the Supreme Court 
and Justice Kennedy on Lawrence: “Proposition 8 is unconstitutional because it 
denies plaintiffs a fundamental right without a legitimate (much less compelling) 
reason.”253 The Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments in Perry last December.254 But 
when former California Governor Schwarzenegger and current Governor Jerry 
Brown refused to continue to defend Proposition 8, the Ninth Circuit asked the 
California Supreme Court to determine whether conservative legal groups fighting 
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Perry had standing to continue on.255 The California Supreme Court heard 
arguments on the standing issue on September 6, 2011256 and will soon weigh in on 
the issue. Still, many expect that the Supreme Court will ultimately resolve the 
case.257 In the second decision, Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, handed 
down on July 8, 2010, Judge Joseph Tauro struck down section 3 of DOMA as a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.258 The First Circuit should hear arguments 
in the case this year.259  
With Perry and Gill, the Supreme Court will have another opportunity to revisit 
its decision in Lawrence. In Cook, the Court was not willing to go there, and the 
progression of gay rights in the judiciary seemed poised to return to the state of the 
Bowers era.260 Perhaps in Perry or Gill the Court will try to reclaim the title of “an 
institution where gay Americans can seek justice.”261 
CONCLUSION 
Like the opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, Lawrence v. Texas was 
consciously written to avoid a controversial issue,262 same-sex marriage. The 
Supreme Court has been strategically side-stepping that issue ever since. The story 
of DADT and the Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari to Cook v. Gates in 
2009 provide an especially telling illustration of the Court’s strategic behavior. In 
2005, Professor Klarman remarked: 
Five members of this Court are not about to strike down any time soon 
bans on same-sex marriage—not when public opinion strongly supports 
such laws. Figuring out how the Court in such a case would distinguish 
Lawrence is an interesting question. Perhaps the Court would simply 
refuse to take such a case . . . .263 
Five years later, it is remarkable just how right Klarman was. While the 
Supreme Court’s decision to pass on DADT in Cook v. Gates was not about 
same-sex marriage, the issue was lurking below the surface. The American public 
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was not ready for the Court to take the next step in its substantive due process 
protections for gay rights in 2009. Three Iowa justices learned this lesson the hard 
way. It took the Supreme Court thirteen years to extend Brown to 
antimiscegenation laws.264 So far only eight years have passed since Lawrence. 
Professor Tribe was right to call Lawrence the Brown v. Board of Education of the 
gay rights movement, but perhaps for the wrong reason. Lawrence, like Brown, was 
not a “vanguard of social reform” but a “laggard” waiting complacently on public 
opinion.265 The unfortunate consequence of the Court’s idleness is that full 
constitutional respect and equal protection under the law for gay Americans must 
wait. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 264. Notably, although Justice Ginsburg rejected the idea that courts should shape policy 
alone, see supra text accompanying note 204, she conceded that Brown v. Board of 
Education is one example where the Supreme Court was right to step ahead of other political 
branches. See Ginsburg, supra note 204, at 1206. In fairness, Justice Ginsburg quickly 
pointed out the holding in Brown was quite limited. See id. at 1207. 
 265. Klarman, supra note 82, at 440–45. 
